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On the Relations Between Diffie-Hellman and ID-Based Key
Agreement from Pairings ∗
Shengbao Wang †
Abstract
This paper studies the relationships between the traditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol and the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol from pairings.
For the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara (SOK) ID-based key construction, we show that identical to
the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the SOK key agreement protocol also has three variants, namely
ephemeral, semi-static and static versions. Upon this, we build solid relations between authenti-
cated Diffie-Hellman (Auth-DH) protocols and ID-based authenticated key agreement (IB-AK)
protocols, whereby we present two substitution rules for this two types of protocols. The rules
enable a conversion between the two types of protocols. In particular, we obtain the real ID-based
version of the well-known MQV (and HMQV) protocol.
Similarly, for the Sakai-Kasahara (SK) key construction, we show that the key transport
protocol underlining the SK ID-based encryption scheme (which we call the “SK protocol”) has
its non-ID counterpart, namely the Hughes protocol. Based on this observation, we establish
relations between corresponding ID-based and non-ID-based protocols. In particular, we propose
a highly enhanced version of the McCullagh-Barreto protocol.
Key words. Authenticated Diffie-Hellman, SOK protocol, ID-based key agreement, ID-MQV,
eMB
1 Introduction
In 2005, Boyd and Choo [7] and Wang et al. [35] noticed that there are some similarities between
(pairing-based) ID-based and non-ID-based authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols. This study
further investigate this observation. Interestingly, we discover much more than those researchers
previously might imagined.
1.1 Proposed Novel Protocols
We discover some important substitution rules (see Table 3, 4) between the two different types of
protocols. The rules enable a useful conversion between the authenticated version of the two types
of protocols. By applying these rules, we present three novel protocols (namely, the protocols which
are highlighted in bold in Table 1 and 2) which possesses remarkable performance and security.
1. The real ID-based version of the MQV (and, HMQV) protocol — ID-MQV. (See Fig. 12.)
2. The enhanced MB (McCullagh–Barreto) ID-based protocol — eMB. (See Fig. 16.)
3. The non-ID-based version of the SYL protocol — nID-SYL (See Appendix A, Fig. 18 ).
∗First version, January 2008; This version (July 2009) is a minor revison.
†(Email: shengbaowang@gmail.com) The author is currently with New Star Institute of Applied Technology, China
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Table 1: Corresponding Protocols (non-ID-Based vs. ID-Based)
Protocol Type Prot. Message Auth. DH Protocols ⇔ ID-Based Protocols
A0 TA = xP MTI/A0 ⇔ Smart [31]
Enhanced A0 (H)MQV ⇔ ID-MQV (See Fig. 12)
A1 TA = xQA MTI/A1 ⇔ Chen–Kudla [11]
Enhanced A1 (H)MQV-1 ⇔ Wang [33], Chow–Choo [10]
C0 TA = xQB MTI/C0 ⇔ MB-1 [20]
Enhanced C0 ECKE-1N [37] ⇔ eMB (See Fig. 16)
B0 MTI/B0 ⇔ MB-2 [21]
C1 TA = xFAB MTI/C1 ⇔ Scott [26]
Enhanced C1 Enhanced MTI/C1 (See Fig. 19) ⇔ Open Problem!
Table 2: Corresponding Protocols (Broken and Repaired Ones)
Protocol Type Protocol Message Auth. DH Protocols ⇔ ID-Based Protocols
A0 Variant-1 TA = xP Reduced MQV ⇔ Shim [28]
Repaired Protocol nID-SYL (See Fig. 18) ⇔ SYL [40]
C0 Variant-1 TA = xQB K = (x+ y + xy)P ⇔ Xie [39]
Repaired Protocol K = (x + y)P ||xyP ⇔ LYL [19]
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 denotes an additive group of prime order q and G2 a multiplicative group of the same order.
We let P denote a generator of G1. For us, an admissible pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2 with
the following properties:
1. The map e is bilinear: given Q,R ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , we have e(aQ, bR) = e(Q,R)
ab.
2. The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
3. The map e is efficiently computable.
Typically, the map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over
a finite field.
3 Three Versions of the SOK Protocol and the Substitution
Rules
We first focus on the SOK ID-based key setting [32]. We show that the static SOK protocol from
[32] has two more variants, i.e., the semi-static and ephemeral SOK protocols.
Note that the figures given in the rest of the paper are all self-explaining.
2
3.1 Static DH and the SOK-NIKD Protocols
As observed by Boyd, Mao and Paterson [4] and Ryu et al. [25], the two non-interactively shared static
secret from the Diffie-Hellman protocol [12] and the SOK non-interactive ID-based key distribution
(SOK-NIKD) protocol [32] are FDH = abP and FSOK = e(QA, QB)
s, respectively.
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
certA 99K
L99 certB
FDH = aQB = abP FDH = bQA = abP
Figure 1: The Static DH Protocol [12]
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
IDA 99K
L99 IDB
FSOK = e(SA,QB) = e(QA, QB)
s FSOK = e(SB,QA) = e(QA, QB)
s
Figure 2: The SOK-NIKD Protocol [32] — Static SOK
Important observation #1: aQB −→ e(SA, QB).
3.2 Semi-Static and Ephemeral SOK Protocols
3.2.1 The Semi-Static SOK Protocol
It is well-known that the ElGamal encryption scheme [13] is derived from the semi-static (or half-
static, half-ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman protocol [22]. Based on this seemingly obvious relation, we
find that the Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption (IBE) [3, 27] is derived from the semi-static SOK
protocol (presented in Fig. 3). Note that Paterson and Srinivasan [24] also, independently, noticed
the relation. However, they do not give the term “semi-static SOK protocol” explicitly (let alone
the ephemeral SOK) and only uses the static SOK protocol, i.e. the SOK-NIKD protocol. We
stress that the explicit classification of the SOK protocol, corresponding to the three version of the
Diffie-Hellman protocol, is essential for the main result of this paper.
In the rest of the paper, P0 stands for the public key of the private key generator (PKG), with
P0 = sP and s being the master private key of the PKG.
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair:
(Alice has no static keys.) 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP
TA−−−−−−−→
L99 IDB
FsSOK = e(P0, xQB) FsSOK = e(SB, TA)
Figure 3: The Semi-Static SOK Protocol
3.2.2 The Ephemeral SOK Protocol
The protocol is presented in Fig. 4.
Alice Bob
(Alice has no static keys.) (Bob has no static keys either.)
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
FeSOK = e(P0, xTB) = e(P0, P )
xy FeSOK = e(P0, xTA) = e(P0, P )
xy
Figure 4: Ephemeral SOK Protocol
3.3 The UM and the RYY Protocols
The RYY protocol [25] is build upon the UM protocol [1, 15]1. The two session secrets of the two
protocols are K = FDH ||xyP and K = FSOK ||xyP , respectively. A common weakness of them is
that they do not possess K-CI resilience [7, 35].
1Later, however, we will see that in the exact ID-based version of the UM protocol, xyP should be replaced by
e(xsP, yp). This creates an escrowable RYY protocol.
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
FDH = aQB = abP FDH = bQA = abP
k = xTB = xyP k = yTA = xyP
sk = H2(A||B||FDH ||k) sk = H2(A||B||FDH ||k)
Figure 5: The UM Protocol [1]
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
FSOK = e(SA,QB) = e(QA, QB)
s FSOK = e(SB,QA) = e(QA, QB)
s
k = xTB = xyP k = yTA = xyP
sk = H2(A||B||FSOK ||k) sk = H2(A||B||FSOK ||k)
Figure 6: The RYY Protocol [25]
3.4 The MTI/A0 and the Smart Protocols
For those who are unfamiliar with the MTI protocol family, we refer to [22, 9, 8]. The same design
idea that produces the MTI/A0 and the Smart protocols was previously noticed, e.g. in [36], the
authors used the term “Encrypt–Decrypt method”. Concretely, the MTI/A0 protocol is based on
the standard ElGamal encryption, while Smart’s protocol [31] is based on the Boneh–Franklin IBE
[3]. However, the relations between the computation of the two session secrets (c.f. the following
observation No. 2) has not yet been identified before. The two session secrets of the two protocols
are K = aTB + xQB and K = e(SA, TB)e(sP, xQB), respectively. A common weakness of the two
protocol is that they do not have perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
K = aTB + xQB = (ay + bx)P K = bTA + yQA = (ay + bx)P
sk = H2(A||B||K) sk = H2(A||B||K)
Figure 7: The MTI/A0 Protocol [23]
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
K = e(SA, TB)e(sP,xQB) K = e(SB, TA)e(sP, yQA)
sk = H2(A||B||K) sk = H2(A||B||K)
Figure 8: The Smart Protocol [31]
From our first observation, aTB should be changed to e(SA, TB). Here we further notice that xQB
is changed to e(sP, xQB), with the help of the master public-key P0 (P0 = sP )
2. Therefore, we get
our second observation. Here Qi (i = {1, 2}) are any publicly computable elements in group G1, such
as QA +QB, QA + TB, with QA, QB being public keys and TB being the protocol message sent out
by Bob.
Important observation #2: aQ1 + xQ2 −→ e(SA, Q1)e(P0, xQ2).
We summarize the above two observations with the following two substitution rules in Table 3.
2In [34], it was shown that under the SOK key setting, IBE also exists if the master public-key of the PKG is set
to be P0 = s−1P . We stress that this is also true with ID-based key agreement protocols, namely setting P0 = s−1P
will not affect the correctness and security of the A0 type ID-based protocols (e.g., Smart’s, the SYL and our proposed
ID-MQV), all that needed is to replace the protocol message TA = xP with TA = xP0, and then adjust the computation
of the session secrets accordingly.
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Table 3: Substitution Rules for the SOK Key Construction
Auth. DH ID-Based Protocols
Static Private-key: a Static Private-key: SA = sQA
Notations Static Public-key: QA = aP Static Public-key: QA = H(IDA)
Ephemeral Private-key: x Ephemeral Private-key: x
Publicly-computable group element: Publicly-computable group element:
Q,Q1, Q2 Q,Q1, Q2
Two Rules Rule 1. K = aQ ⇔ K = e(SA, Q)
Rule 2. K = aQ1 + xQ2 ⇔ K = e(SA, Q1)e(P0, xQ2)
4 Relations between Pairs of Existing Protocols
Applying the above two important substitution rules, we discover some unpublished relations between
some pairs of existing protocols.
4.1 The MTI/A1 and the Chen–Kudla Protocols
The Chen–Kudla protocol [11] can be obtained by directly applying the above two substitution rules.
In MTI/A1, the session secret is K = aTB + axQB . Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the
session secret is K = e(SA, TB)e(SA, xQB) = e(SA, TB + xQB). This is exactly the Chen–Kudla [11]
protocol!
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xQA TB = yQB
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
K = aTB + axQB = a(TB + xQB) K = bTA + byQA = b(TA + yQA)
sk = H2(A||B||K) sk = H2(A||B||K)
Figure 9: The MTI/A1 Protocol [23]
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xQA TB = yQB
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
K = e(SA,TB + xQB) K = e(SB, TA + yQA)
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 10: The Chen–Kudla Protocol [11]
4.2 The MQV-1 and Wang’s Protocols
Wang’s protocol [33] can be obtained from the so-called MQV-1 protocol by directly applying the
above two rules.
We first review the famous MQV [18] protocol. Note that the HMQV protocol [17] is a hashed
variant of the MQV protocol.
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
hA = H1(QB, TA) hB = H1(QA, TB)
hB = H1(QA, TB) hA = H1(QB, TA)
K = (x+ ahA)(TB + hBQB) K = (y + bhB)(TA + hAQA)
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 11: The (H)MQV Protocol [18, 17]
The MQV-1 protocol can be obtained by simply changing the protocol message TA = xP to be
TA = xQA, and then adjust the protocol accordingly. The session secret of the MQV-1 protocol
is K = (x + hA)a(TB + hBQB). Therefore in its ID-based counterpart, the session secret is K =
e((x+hA)SA, TB+hBQB), this is exactly the Chow–Choo protocol [10] — a hashed variant of Wang’s
protocol [33].
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5 Obtaining the Real ID-Based MQV Protocol
5.1 Our ID-MQV Protocol
The session secret in (H)MQV is as follows:
K = (x+ hAa)(TB + hBQB) = x(TB + hBQB) + hAa(TB + hBQB).
We let Q1 = TB + hBQB and Q2 = hA(TB + hBQB) = hAQ1, then
K = xQ1 + aQ2,
Applying Rule #2, we obtain the ID-based version of this protocol — ID-MQV, its session secret K
is as follows:
K = e(P0, xQ1)e(SA, Q2) = e(xP0, Q1)e(hASA, Q1) = e(xP0 + hASA, Q1),
recall that Q1 = TB + hBQB, thus we have
K = e(xP0 + hASA, TB + hBQB).
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA=xP−−−−−−−−−−→
TB=yP
←−−−−−−−−−−
hA = H1(QB, TA) hB = H1(QA, TB)
hB = H1(QA, TB) hA = H1(QB, TA)
K = e(xP0 + hASA, hBQB + TB) K = e(yP0 + hBSB, hAQA + TA)
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 12: ID-MQV: ID-Based (H)MQV Protocol
If we wipe off hA and hB, then the above ID-MQV protocol degenerate into the Shim protocol
[28] which is given in Fig 13. However, the Shim protocols is totally broken by Sun and Hsie [29]. In
2005, Yuan and Li [40] repaired the Shim protocol using a very simple idea, namely just adding an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman value. The improved protocol is called the Shim-Yuan-Li (SYL) protocol
(see Fig. 17) and was proven to be secure by Chen et al. [5]. In Fig. 18, we present the non-ID-based
version of the SYL protocol — nID-SYL.
9
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
K = e(xP0 + SA, QB + TB) K = e(yP0 + SB, QA + TA)
sk = H2(A||B||K) sk = H2(A||B||K)
Figure 13: The Shim Protocol [28]
5.2 Remarks on the ID-MQV Protocol
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
hA = H1(QB, TA) hB = H1(QA, TB)
hB = H1(QA, TB) hA = H1(QB , TA)
K1 = e(xP0 + hASA, hBQB + TB) K1 = e(yP0 + hBSB, hAQA + TA)
K2 = xTB = xyP K2 = yTA = xyP
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2)
Figure 14: Escrowless ID-MQV: ID-Based (H)MQV Protocol with PKG-FS
Our ID-MQV protocol has remarkable superiorities over all the existing ID-based key agreement
protocols (from pairings).
1. From the format of the protocol messages, we argue that our ID-MQV is the real ID-based version
of the famous (H)MQV protocol. As mentioned above, the Chow–Choo and Wang protocols are
ID-based version of the so-called (H)MQV-1 protocols, which have different protocol messages.
2. Separating perfect forward secrecy (PFS) from PKG forward secrecy (PKG-FS). Note that
PKG-FS also means escrowless. We argue that in some applications (as also pointed out by
McCullagh and Barreto [20]) key escrow is a requirement or even, a must. However, if we
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remove K1 = abP from the SYL protocol [40] to open escrow, then it become totally insecure
(which is exactly Shim’s protocol [28]), let alone PFS. Our new protocol can be securely used
in escrowed model (i.e., w/o xyP ), providing PFS. When xyP is added, the protocol becomes
escrowless (and achieves PKG-FS, see Fig. 14). In a word, xyP separates clearly PFS from
PKG-FS, and our new protocol (ID-MQV) can be used with or without escrow.
3. Compared with Wang’s protocol [33] (and the Chow-Choo protocol [10]), our protocol does not
need extra message exchange to close escrow, while the latter requires a party to send out an
extra point. At the same time, brings extra computation for the party.
4. The new protocol can be further strengthened to achieve stronger security, i.e., to be secure in
the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model which allows ephemeral secret key reveal. (Using
the same idea from [6].)
6 Beyond the SOK ID-Based Key Construction
Now we look at the SK key setting. For details on the key setting, please refer to [30] and [20, 38].
Here we note that the master private and public key pair of the PKG is 〈s, P0 = sP 〉. u is part of a
user’s static public key and for Alice uA = H
′(IDA) ∈ Z
∗
q .
We discover that the key transport protocol behind the SK-IBE [30] is simply the ID-based version
of the Hughes protocol [16]. This is mainly because the static private key of the receivers in the two
protocols are both inversion-based. The substitution rules are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Substitution Rules for the SK Key Construction
Auth. DH ID-Based Protocols
Static key pair: Static key pair: 〈SA = s+ uA)
−1QP ,
Notations 〈a,QA = aP 〉 QA = P0 + uAP = (s+ uA)P 〉
Ephemeral Private-key: x Ephemeral Private-key: x
Publicly-computable element: Q Publicly-computable element: Q
Rule 1. K = a−1Q ⇔ K = e(SA, Q)
Two Rules Rule 2. K = xP , ⇔ K = e(P, P )x
Using the above rules, we can establish the relations between the MB protocols [20, 21] and the
MTI/C0 and MTI/B0 [23] protocols (c.f. Table 1), the details are omitted here. Next, based on
the enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol), we propose a highly efficient ID-based
protocol — eMB.
6.1 Review of the ECKE-1N Protocol
This protocol was initially designed using the ideas from MQV. It was later included in a Letter
appeared in IEEE Communications Letters entitled “Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Protocol” [37]. (Also available at IACR ePrint, report 2007/026.) The protocol
is give in Fig. 15.
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xQB TB = yQA
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
hA = H1(QB, TA) hB = H1(QA, TB)
hB = H1(QA, TB) hA = H1(QB, TA)
K = a−1(x+ hA)(TB + hBQA) K = b
−1(y + hB)(TA + hAQB)
= (x+ hA)(y + hB)P = (x+ hA)(y + hB)P
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 15: The Enhanced MTI/C0 Protocol — ECKE-1N
6.2 The eMB Protocol
Applying the substitution rules from Table 4, we converse our ECKE-1N into an ID-based authen-
ticated key agreement protocol which is the enhanced version of the McCullagh-Barreto protocol
[20, 21] — eMB.
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = (s+ uA)
−1P , 〈SB = (s+ uB)
−1P ,
QA = P0 + uAP = (s+ uA)P 〉 QB = P0 + uBP = (s+ uB)P 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
QB = P0 + uBP = (s+ uB)P QA = P0 + uAP = (s+ uA)P
TA = xQB TB = yQA
TA−−−−−−−→
TB←−−−−−−−
hA = H(QB, TA) hB = H(QA, TB)
hB = H(QA, TB) hA = H(QB, TA)
K = e((x+ hA)SA, TB + hBQA) K = e((y + hB)SB, TA + hAQB)
= e(P, P )(x+hA)(y+hB) = e(P, P )(x+hA)(y+hB)
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 16: The eMB Protocol
We remark that the substitution rules in the SK ID-based key setting can also be applied to the
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SK variants, e.g. Gentry’s key setting [14] and the second Boneh-Boyen (BB2) scheme [2].
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A Obtaining an Authenticated DH Protocol from the SYL
Protocol
The two protocols are presented in Fig. 17 and 18, respectively.
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈SA = sQA, QA = H(IDA)〉 〈SB = sQB, QB = H(IDB)〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA=xP−−−−−−−−−−→
TB=yP
←−−−−−−−−−−
K1 = xTB = xyP K1 = yTA = xyP
K2 = e(xP0 + SA, QB + TB) K2 = e(yP0 + SB, QA + TA)
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2)
Figure 17: The SYL Protocol [40]
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Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xP TB = yP
TA=xP−−−−−−−−−−→
TB=yp
←−−−−−−−−−
K1 = xTB = xyP K1 = yTA = xyP
K2 = (x+ a)(QB + TB) K2 = (y + b)(QA + TA)
= (x+ a)(y + b)P = (x+ a)(y + b)P
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K1||K2)
Figure 18: nID-SYL: A New Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol
B Enhanced MTI/C1 Protocol
This protocol can be easily derived from our enhanced MTI/C0 protocol (i.e. the ECKE-1N protocol)
using the idea from [23].
Alice Bob
long-term private/public key pair: long-term private/public key pair:
〈a,QA = aP 〉 〈b,QB = bP 〉
x ∈R Z
∗
q y ∈R Z
∗
q
TA = xaQB = xFDH TB = ybQA = yFDH
TA=xabP−−−−−−−−−−−→
TB=yabP
←−−−−−−−−−−−
hA = H1(QB, TA) hB = H1(QA, TB)
hB = H1(QA, TB) hA = H1(QB , TA)
K = (x + a−1hA)(TB + hBQA) K = (y + b
−1hB)(TA + hAQB)
= (ax + hA)(yb + hB)P = (by + hB)(xa+ hA)P
sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K) sk = H2(A||B||TA||TB||K)
Figure 19: The Enhanced MTI/C1 Protocol
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